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Humans are clearly sensitive to causal structures—we can describe and understand causal 
mechanisms and make predictions based on them. But this chapter asks: Is causal learning always 
causal? Or might seemingly causal behavior sometimes be based on associations that merely encode 
the information that two events “go together,” not that one causes the other? This associative view 
supposes that people often (mis)interpret associations as supporting the existence of a causal 
relationship between events; they make the everyday mistake of confusing correlation with 
causation. To assess the validity of this view, one must move away from considering specific 
implementations of associative models and instead focus on the general principle embodied by the 
associative approach—that the rules governing learning are general-purpose, and so do not 
differentiate between situations involving cause–effect relationships and those involving signaling 
relationships that are non-causal. 
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The roots of the associative approach to causal cognition can be traced back to the British 
Empiricist philosophers of the 17th and 18th century. Most influential among these was David 
Hume, who viewed the causal relationship as central to all understanding, describing causation as 
‘the cement of the universe’. Hume (1740/1978) noted in his ‘A Treatise on Human Understanding’ 
that neither the senses nor reason can establish that one object (a cause) is connected together with 
another object (an effect) in such a way that the presence of one necessarily entails the existence of 
the other. In other words, we cannot observe the nature of the causal connection between two 
events. In the case of a falling stone, we are unable to directly perceive some law of gravity that 
causes the stone to fall. But despite our inability to see or prove that there are necessary causal 
connections, we continue to think and act as if we had knowledge of such connections. Hume 
proposed that our beliefs in the connectivity between causes and effects arise simply as a result of 
the constant conjunction (or association) of those events – that is, by the perception of regularities 
in our experience. Hume asks us to consider the case of a putative Adam, brought to life in the 
midst of the world and in ‘the full vigour of understanding’. Adam would behave as if he had no 
knowledge of causal relationships in the world. He would be unable to predict that putting his hand 
in a flame would cause pain, or that clouds anticipate the likely onset of rain. Whereas we, endowed 
with the same senses and faculties of reasoning, are unable to resist making these and countless 
other such predictions. 
The critical difference between Adam and ourselves is experience of associations between 
events in the world; in particular, between causes and effects. Thus we have observed many 
examples of one object striking another and causing this second to move. Despite, as Hume notes, 
the causal connection between these events being unobservable, this constant conjunction gives rise 
to an expectation that one event will be followed by a second. Hume proposed that it is this 
expectation that is manifest in the mind as a necessary connection, or belief. Hence the idea of 
necessary connection or causality, which arises as a result of regularities of experience, has its root 
in the mind, and is then projected onto the world in the form of predictive knowledge. 
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This idea that causal knowledge derives from experience of statistical regularities between 
events in the world clearly has strong ties to the notion of associative learning: learning that events 
are associated with one another, on the basis of experience of their co-occurrence. As a result of 
over a century’s scientific study of associative learning in humans and nonhuman animals (going 
back to Thorndike, 1898), we now have a reasonable grasp of the fundamental principles underlying 
associative learning. Encouraged by this corpus of knowledge, Dickinson, Shanks and Evenden 
(1984) suggested that the established principles of associative learning could usefully be brought to 
bear on the issue of causal learning; in essence, they argued that causal cognition could usefully be 
brought under the umbrella of associative learning. This suggestion prompted a wave of empirical 
studies that have attempted to test the validity of this framework. We shall argue in this chapter that 
while the results of this research were, at best, mixed, the most important outcome was a greater 
understanding of the complexities and nuances of causal learning and behaviour. 
Causal learning as associative learning 
‘Causal learning’ and ‘associative learning’ are not synonyms. Crucially, associative learning 
simply requires a relationship to exist between the occurrence of two events, but it does not require 
this relationship to be a causal one. That is, associative learning is based on covariation, not 
causality. For example, Pavlov’s (1927) dogs learned that a bell preceded delivery of food, but the 
sound of the bell did not cause the food to be delivered. Similarly, I might learn that the seminars in 
our department on Fridays tend to be more interesting than those on Wednesdays, but the day of the 
week does not cause one seminar to be better than another (that is, correlation does not equal 
causation). 
In fact, we can divide examples of associative learning into three categories. The first 
involves instrumental (or operant) learning; that is, learning about the relationship between an 
action and the outcome that it produces. For example, flipping a light-switch is associated with a 
light turning on. Clearly, instrumental learning must involve a causal relationship.1 The second 
category we can term causal Pavlovian learning. This involves the situation in which one external 
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event signals the occurrence of a second external event by virtue of a causal relationship between 
them. For example, we might learn that when clouds appear in the sky, rain is likely to follow. The 
final category is non-causal Pavlovian learning, where one external event signals another but does 
not cause that second event to occur. The examples in the preceding paragraph of Pavlov’s dogs and 
interesting seminar days fall into this latter category. 
Recent work on the conditioning of attention provides a particularly clear demonstration of 
Pavlovian learning that is not based on causal knowledge. Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths and Beesley 
(2015) trained participants on a visual search task in which they were required to look at a target (a 
diamond) as quickly as possible. The appearance of a particular distractor stimulus (say, a red 
circle) in the search display on a given trial signalled that participants would receive a large 
monetary reward for looking at the target, while the presence of a different distractor (a blue circle) 
signalled that looking at the target would receive low reward. However, if participants looked at the 
distractor at any point prior to looking at the target, the reward that was scheduled for that trial was 
omitted. Under these circumstances, participants were nevertheless more likely to look at the ‘high-
value’ distractor (the red circle in this case) than the ‘low-value’ distractor, even though doing so 
meant that they were more likely to miss out on large rewards than small rewards. That is, the high-
value distractor was more likely to capture attention than was the low-value distractor. The 
implication is that attentional capture in this task was modulated by the Pavlovian relationship 
between distractor colour and reward: the high-value distractor had a Pavlovian relationship with 
large reward (i.e., it signalled the availability of large reward), and as a consequence of this 
relationship it became more likely to capture attention in future. Notably, this conditioned capture 
of attention by the high-value distractor occurred even if participants were explicitly informed that 
looking at the distractor caused omission of the reward, both in initial instructions and following 
every trial on which reward was omitted (Pearson, Donkin, Tran, Most & Le Pelley, 2015). In fact, 
the magnitude of the conditioned effect was unaltered compared to the case in which participants 
were not explicitly informed of this causal relationship regarding omissions. So even when 
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participants were fully aware of the true causal relationship present in the task, their conditioned 
attentional response was not influenced by this knowledge; instead their conditioned responding 
continued to follow the (non-causal) Pavlovian relationship between colours and rewards. The 
suggestion, then, is that this example of a conditioned attentional response—wherein stimuli that 
predict high reward are more likely to capture attention than those that signal low reward—reflects 
the operation of a relatively automatic Pavlovian process that is not sensitive to causal knowledge. 
To summarise, associative learning can be based on learning about causal relationships, but it 
can also be insensitive to causality. One view, then, is that causal learning is simply a subset of 
associative learning. According to this framework, there is a general-purpose set of principles that 
underlie associative learning, and these principles apply equally to situations involving causality 
and those that merely involve signalling (that is, covariation). The alternative is that there is 
something ‘special’ about causal relationships that sets them apart from instances of mere 
covariation (Cheng & Lu, this volume; Rottman, this volume; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2005). To 
the extent that this alternative hypothesis is true, the associative account of causal learning will be 
found wanting. Below we consider some of the evidence for parallels between causal and non-
causal associative learning. 
Contiguity, contingency and cue competition 
In a series of papers, Dickinson, Shanks and colleagues (for reviews, see Dickinson, 2001; 
Shanks, 1995) investigated whether the formation of causal beliefs in humans was subject to 
certain, ‘standard’ associative principles that had been established in earlier studies of animal 
conditioning. The first of these is the temporal contiguity of events; that is, the delay between their 
occurrence. Animal studies of non-causal Pavlovian conditioning show that the greater the delay 
between two events, the weaker the association that is formed between them. For example, if a tone 
CS reliably signals a puff of air to the eye (US), then a rabbit will learn to move its nictitating 
membrane (third eyelid) in response to the tone so as to attenuate the influence of the air puff. This 
conditioning occurs rapidly if the US follows 250 ms after the CS during training, but the rate of 
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conditioning steadily decreases as the CS–US interval used during training becomes longer 
(Schneiderman & Gormezano, 1964; for related examples, see Gibbon, Baldock, Locurto, Gold & 
Terrace, 1977; Hawkins, Carew & Kandel, 1986; Ost & Lauer, 1965). Shanks and Dickinson (1991) 
demonstrated that causal learning in humans shows a similar sensitivity to temporal contiguity. In 
their task, participants could press a button whenever they liked, at a cost of 1 point. The outcome 
was the illumination of a figure on the screen, and every time this outcome occurred, participants 
gained 3 points. Participants were asked to maximise the number of total points gained. In fact, 90% 
of button-presses generated an outcome, so the optimal strategy was to press the button as 
frequently as possible. If the outcome immediately followed the action, then participants did indeed 
learn to press the button at a high rate, and at the end of the experiment reported a strong belief in a 
causal relationship between action and outcome. However, training with a delay of 2 or 4 s between 
action and outcome disrupted this pattern, producing a rate of button-pressing that did not differ 
from that of other participants trained under a regime in which pressing the button had no influence 
at all on whether the outcome occurred. This effect of delay was also reflected in participants’ 
judgments of the strength of the causal relationship between action and outcome; with a 4-s delay, 
this relationship was judged to be around half as strong as with no delay. 
Causal and non-causal learning also show similar sensitivity to the degree of contingency 
between events, where contingency is defined as the difference between the probability of event 2 
(E2) occurring given that event 1 (E1) has occurred [denoted P(E2|E1) ], and the probability of E2 
occurring in the absence of E1 [denoted P(E2| ¬E1) ]. Using rats, Rescorla (1968; see also Rescorla, 
1967) demonstrated that the degree of contingency between a tone CS and an electric shock US 
modulated the strength of Pavlovian conditioning. One group of rats experienced training in which 
shocks only ever occurred in the presence of the tone CS. These rats showed evidence of rapidly 
developing a fear of the tone (in that hearing the tone would cause them to stop pressing a lever that 
delivered food). A second group of rats experienced the same number of occasions on which the CS 
and US were paired (with the same degree of temporal contiguity). However, for this group, 
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additional USs could occur when the CS was not present, such that overall there was no 
contingency between CS and US, i.e., P(shock | tone) = P(shock | ¬ tone). These rats showed no 
evidence of developing fear of the CS, suggesting that the lack of contingency between CS and US 
prevented the learning of an association between them. Shanks and Dickinson (1991; see also 
Chatlosh, Neunaber & Wasserman, 1985) demonstrated that causal learning of action–outcome 
relationships by humans is also sensitive to contingency. Using the procedure outlined in the 
previous paragraph, they found that participants’ rate of button-pressing and judgments of the 
strength of the causal relationship between action and outcome declined systematically as the 
probability of unpaired outcomes (i.e. illuminations of the figure when the button had not been 
pressed) increased. 
In fact, the relationship between contingency and learning is more subtle, and more 
interesting, than this. Studies of non-causal Pavlovian conditioning have shown that, when exposed 
to non-contingent presentations of a tone and shock, rats initially develop fear of the tone, but as 
experience continues this fear diminishes and eventually disappears (Rescorla, 1972). Moreover, the 
strength of preasymptotic fear depends on the overall frequency of shock: Rescorla also showed that 
this fear was greater in a condition in which P(shock | tone) = P(shock | ¬ tone) = 0.4 than in a 
condition in which P(shock | tone) = P(shock | ¬ tone) = 0.1. This is known as the outcome density 
bias. Both of these findings are mirrored in studies of causal learning in humans (for a review, see 
Shanks, 1995). Specifically, people’s judgments of the strength of a relationship between a cause 
and an effect are influenced by the overall frequency of the outcome (the effect), even if there is no 
contingency between the ‘cause’ and the effect (Allan & Jenkins, 1983). However, as training 
continues this influence of outcome frequency on causal judgments decreases, with judgments 
eventually coming to reflect normative contingencies (Shanks, López, Darby & Dickinson, 1996; 
Wasserman, Chatlosh & Neunaber, 1983). 
************************ 




Further research shows that learning about the relationship between E1 and E2 is influenced not 
only by the degree of contingency between E1 and E2, but also by the degree of contingency 
between other events (E3, E4 etc) and E2, if these other events sometimes occur at the same time as 
E1. This is most neatly illustrated by the case of blocking (Kamin, 1968). A particularly clear, 
within-subjects demonstration of blocking of non-causal Pavlovian conditioning in animals is 
provided by McNally and Cole (2006); see Table 1. Rats were initially exposed to pairings of a 
visual CS, denoted stimulus A, with shock. In a subsequent phase of training, rats experienced trials 
on which A was presented in compound with a novel auditory stimulus, B, and again followed by 
shock. Also occurring in this latter phase were trials on which a compound of a novel visual 
stimulus, C, and a novel auditory stimulus, D, was paired with shock. Following this treatment, rats 
showed evidence of greater fear of D than of B, suggesting that they had formed a stronger D–shock 
association than their B–shock association. This is interesting, because the experienced contingency 
between B and shock is exactly the same as that between D and shock: both stimuli were paired 
with shock on the same number of trials, and shock was experienced in the absence of each stimulus 
the same number of times. Moreover, the temporal contiguity between CS and shock is the same for 
all CSs. This demonstrates that associative learning is not entirely determined by contingency and 
contiguity. In particular, it shows that associative learning about cue–outcome relationships does 
not proceed independently for each cue considered in isolation: B and D, considered in isolation, 
both have the same relationship with shock, and yet more is learned about D. Instead the 
implication is that learning in Stage 1 that A predicts shock, acts to block subsequent learning that B 
predicts shock on AB  shock trials in Stage 2. In contrast, since neither C nor D has been 
previously established as a predictor of shock when CD  shock trials are first experienced in 
Stage 2, neither will block learning about the other. 
Blocking shows that cues interact in the learning process, and seem to compete for a limited 
amount of a learning resource that the outcome can support – hence blocking is often described as 
an example of cue competition in associative learning. And notably for the purposes of this chapter, 
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blocking also occurs in human causal learning (e.g., Aitken, Larkin & Dickinson, 2000; Griffiths & 
Le Pelley, 2009; Griffiths & Mitchell, 2008; Le Pelley, Beesley & Griffiths, 2014; Le Pelley, 
Beesley & Suret, 2007; Shanks, 1985). For example, Aitken et al. used the common ‘allergy 
prediction’ paradigm, in which participants play an allergist whose aim is to discover the cause of 
reactions in a fictitious patient, Mr. X. On each trial, the participant is told the contents of a meal 
eaten by Mr. X, and must predict whether or not he suffered an allergic reaction as a result. 
Immediate corrective feedback is provided, and each different meal is encountered many times, 
which allows participants to learn the correct response for each meal. For example, they might learn 
that eating beef and sprouts reliably results in an allergic reaction, but eating bananas is not 
followed by a reaction. Aitken et al.’s Experiment 2 contained a blocking contingency and its 
control. In the blocking contingency, Stage 1 trials on which food A was always paired with allergic 
reaction (denoted A+ trials) were followed by Stage 2 trials on which a compound of foods A and B 
was always paired with allergic reaction (AB+). In the control contingency, participants 
experienced Stage 2 trials on which a compound of foods C and D caused reaction (CD+), but 
neither had previously been experienced in Stage 1. In a subsequent test phase participants were 
presented with each cue individually and asked to rate the efficacy of that food as a cause of allergic 
reaction. Blocking was demonstrated, in that food B was perceived as a weaker cause of allergy 
than was food D. 
Another demonstration of an interaction between cues in learning comes from studies of the 
effect of signalling noncontingent outcomes. Rescorla (1972) showed that delivering shocks in the 
inter-trial intervals (ITIs) between pairings of a tone and shock resulted in reduced fear of the tone. 
This is not surprising, since these ITI-shocks result in a reduced contingency between tone and 
shock (see earlier). However, for a further group of rats, all ITI-shocks were signalled by a different 
cue (a clicker). Even though this signal does not alter the contingency between tone and shock, rats 
in this latter group showed significantly greater fear of the tone than did those for whom the ITI-
shocks were unsignalled (see also Durlach, 1983; Rescorla, 1984). Similarly, signalling 
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noncontingent occurrences of an outcome results in higher judgments of the strength of a causal 
relationship between an action (pressing a button) and an outcome (illumination of a figure on a 
screen) in humans (Shanks, 1986, 1989). 
So, causal and non-causal learning show similar sensitivities to a range of factors. Both are 
influenced by the degree of contiguity and contingency between events, and both are subject to cue 
competition. These findings seem to support the idea that there is nothing ‘special’ about causal 
learning; that instead there is a set of general principles for associative learning, and that these 
principles apply equally to situations involving causality as those that don’t. 
At first glance, then, the case for an associative account of causal learning seems to be on 
solid ground. However, this initial promise has subsequently been met with criticisms that can be 
broadly divided into two categories: those that question specific implementations of associative 
principles, and those that question associative principles in general. We shall argue that the former 
present no challenge to the associative account, whereas the latter force us to concede 
(unsurprisingly) that such an account must fall short of providing a full account of human causal 
reasoning. 
The ‘If it’s not Rescorla–Wagner, it’s not associative’ Fallacy: General principles versus 
specific theories 
Many of the phenomena of associative learning described above follow naturally from one of 
the most influential and famous theories of associative learning, the Rescorla–Wagner model 
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). At the heart of this model is the idea that the amount that is learned 
about a given cue on a given trial is related to the ‘surprisingness’ of the outcome on that trial. 
Formally, the model states that the strength of the association between a cue X and an outcome 
(denoted VX) is updated on each trial according to the expression: 
∆𝑉𝑋 = α𝑋 β𝑈𝑆 (λ − ∑ 𝑉) (1) 
where VX represents the change in VX on the current trial, and αX and βUS are fixed parameters 
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representing the salience of cue X and the outcome respectively. The error term ( – ΣV) represents 
the discrepancy between the observed magnitude of the outcome () and the magnitude of the 
outcome expected on the basis of all currently presented cues (ΣV); that is, how surprising the 
occurrence of the outcome is, given the presence of the presented cues. 
Let us consider how this applies to a blocking contingency in which A+ trials are followed by 
AB+ trials. On initial A+ trials, the outcome is surprising, since it is not predicted by A; formally, 
we start with VA = 0, and the magnitude of the outcome on this trial is λ (where λ > 0) so the error 
term on the first trial will be λ – 0 = λ. Hence an association will develop between A and the 
outcome; i.e., VA will increase, and will continue to increase until (asymptotically) VA = λ. Consider 
now the AB+ trials of Stage 2. The outcome occurring on these trials is not surprising, since it is 
well-predicted by the presence of A; formally, on the first Stage 2 trial we have VA ≈ λ (if we 
assume that Stage 1 training approaches asymptote) and VB = 0 (since it is novel), and so the error 
term is given by λ – ΣV = λ – (VA + VB) ≈ 0. Hence little is learned on these trials, and consequently 
B does not form a strong association with the outcome. So the model correctly predicts that prior 
training with A will block later learning about B. 
The Rescorla–Wagner model also provides a natural explanation of the finding that signalling 
noncontingent outcomes results in perception of a stronger cue–outcome relationship (Rescorla, 
1972, 1984; Shanks, 1986, 1989). If we denote the critical cue as A, and the experimental context as 
C, then the condition in which noncontingent outcomes are not signalled can be thought of as 
involving AC+, C+ and C– trials (where the latter represents periods during which the subject is 
exposed to the context but outcomes do not occur). The context will develop a (weak) association 
with the outcome as a consequence of C+ trials. This will render the outcome occurring on AC+ 
trials less surprising than would otherwise be the case, since the error term on these trials is λ – (VA 
+ VC) with VC > 0. Hence (to an extent) learning about the context will block learning about the cue, 
A. Now, if the noncontingent outcomes are signalled by a different stimulus, S, then training 
involves AC+, SC+ and C– trials. The presence of the salient stimulus S on SC+ trials will reduce 
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conditioning of the context C on these trials (through a process of overshadowing: see Rescorla & 
Wagner, 1972). Consequently in this signalled group, the context will not compete with and block 
learning about the cue A to the same extent as in the unsignalled group. Hence the model anticipates 
stronger learning about A in the signalled group than in the unsignalled group, and this is the effect 
observed empirically both in causal and non-causal learning. 
Successes of the Rescorla–Wagner model in explaining phenomena of causal learning such as 
blocking, the effect of signalling, and the outcome density bias (Shanks, 1995, provides a clear 
description of this latter success) fuelled the view that causal learning might be understood in terms 
of the associative principles that are implemented by this model, or one like it. This view had an 
unfortunate consequence, in that it has sometimes been taken to imply that any effect observed in 
causal learning that does not follow from the Rescorla–Wagner model therefore undermines the 
associative account of causal learning more generally. 
An example of this is provided by the phenomenon of backward blocking. Recall that 
blocking involves A+ trials in Stage 1 followed by AB+ and CD+ trials in Stage 2; judgments of the 
causal strength of B following such training are lower than for D. A number of experiments have 
shown that a similar effect can be obtained even if the order of the training stages is reversed; i.e., if 
initial training is with AB+ and CD+, and this is followed by training with A+, then ratings of the 
causal strength of B are lower than those for D (e.g., Le Pelley & McLaren, 2001; Shanks, 1985; 
Wasserman & Berglan, 1998). The implication of this finding is that A+ trials in Stage 2 lead to a 
decline in the causal strength of B, even though B is not experienced during this phase – effects 
such as backward blocking provide examples of the retrospective revaluation of cues. 
Notably, the Rescorla–Wagner model cannot account for backward blocking. Implicit in the 
model is the idea that only presented cues can undergo changes in associative strength: the salience 
of cue X (α𝑋) is assumed to be zero if the cue is not presented, and hence according to Equation (1), 
VX cannot change if X is absent. So the model cannot explain the change in beliefs about B that 
must occur during A+ training in Stage 2 of a backward blocking procedure. 
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The fact that backward blocking lies beyond the Rescorla–Wagner model (and the alternative 
‘acquisition-based’ models of associative learning that were dominant at the time, e.g., Mackintosh, 
1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980; Wagner, 1981) led Shanks and Dickinson (1987) to wonder whether 
such findings undermined the associative approach to causal inference. But this concern is 
premature. While backward blocking clearly undermines the Rescorla–Wagner model (amongst 
others) as a complete account of causal inference, it does not necessarily undermine all possible 
implementations of an associative account. Indeed, it has been noted many times that the Rescorla–
Wagner model does not provide a complete account of associative learning phenomena, regardless 
of the issue of causality (see Le Pelley, 2004; Miller, Barnet & Grahame, 1995). The model remains 
influential because, despite its simplicity, it is able to account for a variety of phenomena of 
conditioning—it has excellent heuristic value—but it does not explain everything. 
To reiterate, the occurrence of backward blocking undermines certain implementations of an 
associative account of causal learning (including the Rescorla-Wagner model), but that does not 
mean that it necessarily falls outside the scope of associative models more generally. Indeed, 
several researchers have proposed associative models that are able to account for this effect (e.g., 
Dickinson & Burke, 1996; Le Pelley & McLaren, 2001; Tassoni, 1995; Van Hamme & Wasserman, 
1994). We should be clear here that we do not mean to endorse a particular associative account of 
backward blocking. We would not necessarily even argue that backwards blocking is best 
interpreted as the outcome of an associative process. Our point is merely that this finding is, at least 
in theory, amenable to an analysis in terms of associative learning, and hence does not provide 
strong evidence on which to evaluate the utility of associative accounts considered as a class. 
At the risk of becoming repetitive, we will restate our general point here since it is critical to 
our aim of evaluating associative accounts of causal learning: ‘associative learning’ and ‘the 
Rescorla–Wagner model’ are not synonymous. Associative learning is a generic term referring to 
learning about the covariation between events based on experience with those events. The 
Rescorla–Wagner model is just one possible mechanism for implementing associative learning. In 
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this chapter, when we contrast associative learning and causal learning, this does not commit us to a 
particular mechanistic view of how associative learning occurs. For example, one view (typified by 
the Rescorla–Wagner model) sees associative learning as mediated by the formation of physical 
links between mental representations of stimulus elements. In some models, formation of these 
links is mediated by the attention that is paid to events (e.g., Le Pelley, 2004, 2010; Mackintosh, 
1975; Pearce & Hall, 1980). An alternative, exemplar-based approach instead assumes that it is 
configurations of elements that form links with other events (e.g., Kruschke, 1992, 2003; Medin & 
Schaffer, 1978). Yet another view eschews the idea of links altogether, and instead argues that 
associative learning is mediated by calculation of probabilities (e.g., Cheng & Novick, 1990; 
Peterson & Beach, 1967), or by propositions that describe the associative relationship between 
events (Mitchell, De Houwer & Lovibond, 2009). A large body of fascinating research has been 
conducted in an attempt to decide between these alternative mechanisms for associative learning 
(see, for example, the chapter by Boddez, De Houwer & Beckers, this volume), but this issue is 
orthogonal to the scope of this chapter. Instead, for the purposes of this chapter, ‘associative 
learning’ simply means ‘learning about covariation, however this is implemented’, and is contrasted 
with ‘causal learning’, which implies sensitivity to causal structure beyond merely covariation.2 
Is there anything special about causality? Part 1: Causal order 
At this point, the reader may be growing concerned about the issue of falsifiability. Might it 
be possible to come up with an associative model that could explain any pattern of data? If so, then 
we might never be able to find evidence that would allow us to judge the value of the associative 
approach considered in its most general terms, which would render it uninteresting from a research 
perspective. However, we shall argue that this is not the case. Specifically, we believe there are 
certain properties that should be common to any associative account, and which—when attempting 
to apply that account to studies of causal learning—generate testable and falsifiable predictions. The 
crucial point is that, as noted earlier, the associative account provides a general-purpose set of 
principles that apply equally to all learning situations, whether those situations involve causality or 
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not. In other words, associative accounts are essentially blind to the nature of the events that are 
involved in learning. On this view, there is nothing ‘special’ about causal relationships that sets 
them apart from instances of mere covariation. 
An example should make this clear. Associative accounts involve learning about signalling 
relationships based on temporal order; that the occurrence of cue events A and B signal that an 
outcome event X will occur subsequently. Hence according to any associative account, the 
‘direction’ of learning—from cues to outcomes—is determined by the temporal order of events. In 
contrast, the direction of causality flows from causes to effects, regardless of the temporal order in 
which those events are encountered. 
Imagine that participants experience a number of trials on which cues A and B appear 
together, and signal that outcome X will occur. Under these circumstances, we would expect cue 
competition between A and B for the limited amount of learning that the outcome X can support 
(similar to the case of blocking described earlier). That is, learning about the relationship between A 
and X will be weaker if training is with ABX (in which competition between A and B will occur; 
the presence of B is said to overshadow learning about A, and vice versa), than if it is with AX 
(in which case there will be no competition). 
We can now contrast two cases. In the first, the scenario is such that cues A and B are 
naturally interpreted as causes (e.g., foods eaten by a patient) and X as an effect (an allergic reaction 
caused by eating allergenic foods). In this case the temporal order of events is aligned with their 
causal order; this is often referred to as a predictive learning scenario. In the second case, the 
scenario is such that cues A and B are naturally interpreted as effects (e.g., symptoms suffered by a 
patient) and X as a cause (a disease that produces those symptoms). In this latter case, the temporal 
order of effects (A and B precede X) is opposite to their causal order (X causes A and B); this is a 
diagnostic learning scenario, in that participants learn to diagnose the cause on the basis of the 
presence of symptoms. 
The important point is that, to an associative model, these two cases are equivalent. In both, 
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the model learns to predict X on the basis of the presence of A and B, regardless of the causal status 
of these events. Hence any phenomenon of learning, such as cue competition, that occurs in a 
predictive learning scenario should also be observed in an otherwise-comparable diagnostic 
learning scenario. However, if people are sensitive to the causal status of events, then we might 
expect to see differences between predictive and diagnostic scenarios, reflecting the different causal 
order inherent in each. In particular, Waldmann and Holyoak (1992, 1997) noted that one should 
expect competition between multiple independent causes of a common effect, but not between 
multiple independent effects of a common cause. If we have experience that eating apple and 
banana causes allergic reaction, and encounter independent evidence that apples cause allergy, then 
this should lead us to reduce the strength of our belief that banana causes allergy. However, if we 
have experience that suffering from Jominy Fever causes nausea and pustules, and encounter 
independent evidence that Jominy Fever causes nausea, this should not lead us to change our belief 
that it also causes pustules. In other words, if participants are sensitive to causal order, then cue 
competition should be observed in a predictive scenario but not in a diagnostic scenario. 
The empirical evidence on this issue is mixed. Some studies have found evidence of an 
asymmetry, with cue competition observed in predictive but not diagnostic scenarios (e.g., Booth & 
Buehner, 2007; Tangen & Allan, 2004, Experiments 1 and 2; Van Hamme, Kao & Wasserman, 
1993; Waldmann, 2000, 2001; Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992). These findings imply a sensitivity to 
causality; that there is something special about a causal relationship that distinguishes it from mere 
signalling of outcomes by cues. Such demonstrations of asymmetry therefore undermine associative 
accounts of causal learning. And, unlike backward blocking, this undermining applies not just to a 
specific implementation of an associative account, but to the approach in general. Having said that, 
however, a number of other studies have reported similar cue competition effects in both predictive 
and diagnostic scenarios (e.g., Cobos, López, Caño, Almaraz & Shanks, 2002; Le Pelley & 
McLaren, 2001; Matute, Arcediano & Miller, 1996; Shanks & López, 1996; Tangen & Allan, 2004, 
Experiments 3 and 4). The symmetry between conditions found in these latter studies implies a lack 
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of sensitivity to causal order, and thus supports the general-purpose, cueoutcome approach taken 
by associative models of learning. 
How, then, are we to reconcile these discrepant findings? A likely possibility relates to the 
‘availability’ of the causal scenario to participants. In the studies cited above that found symmetry 
between predictive and diagnostic learning (suggesting insensitivity to causal order) participants 
simply read instructions regarding the particular causal scenario under which they were being 
tested. The importance of considering causal order was not made explicitly salient to them, and, 
perhaps as a result, the data suggest that they did not consider this information when making 
judgments. In contrast, in the studies demonstrating asymmetry, causal order was typically made 
more salient. For example, Waldmann (2000, 2001) had participants summarize the instructions 
prior to the experiment in order to verify that they had correctly understood the different causal 
structures involved in the different cover stories. It seems likely that this requirement emphasised to 
participants the importance of making use of causal order when forming their judgments, and as a 
consequence no cue competition was observed in the diagnostic condition. 
More direct evidence that the salience of the causal structure is the critical determinant of 
(a)symmetry between predictive and diagnostic learning comes from a study by López, Cobos and 
Caño (2005). In Experiment 1A, participants read ‘standard’ instructions about the causal scenario, 
which involved an electrical box with lights on the front and back. In the predictive condition, 
participants were told that illumination of lights on the front caused illumination of the lights on the 
back; in the diagnostic condition, they were told that illumination of lights on the front was caused 
by the lights on the back. Participants then completed a cue competition task in which, on each trial, 
they were shown which lights were illuminated on the front of the box and were required to predict 
which bulbs would be lit on the back (with corrective feedback). Results showed near-perfect 
symmetry, with equal evidence of cue competition in predictive and diagnostic conditions. 
Importantly, this symmetry did not reflect participants’ failure to understand the task’s causal 
structure, since symmetry was also observed if analysis was restricted to only those participants 
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who could remember and understand the causal structure in a comprehension test conducted after 
the cue competition task. Experiment 2 was exactly the same as Experiment 1A, except that a 
sentence was added to the initial instructions to emphasise the importance of making use of the 
information regarding causal structure: “To solve the task correctly, it is VERY IMPORTANT to 
take into account what you have just read in the instructions. Most importantly, in order to solve the 
different examples of the task… bear in mind that the lights on one side of the box cause the 
illumination of the lights on the other side of the box.” This instruction was sufficient to induce 
asymmetry, with significantly stronger cue competition in the predictive scenario than the 
diagnostic scenario. However, it did not improve participants’ understanding of the causal structure 
of the task as assessed in the final comprehension test, which was similar regardless of the inclusion 
or exclusion of the critical sentence in the instructions. 
To summarize, in Experiment 1A López et al. (2005) showed that participants will not 
necessarily show sensitivity to causal structure even when they are aware of, and understand, this 
structure. In Experiment 2 López et al. showed that, given explicit prompting to use information 
about causal structure when making judgments, participants were able to do so. Here we follow 
Shanks (2007) in arguing that these data support a ‘dual-model’ approach to learning. The 
implication is that, given sufficient motivation, people can reason about causality in a non-
associative way that distinguishes between predictive and diagnostic causal structures. This should 
come as no surprise whatsoever – the fact that we can write about, and you can understand, the 
distinction between these causal structures makes it clear that people are able to comprehend and 
make use of the difference between them. However, it also seems that, without prompting, people’s 
default approach is simply to learn about relationships between cues and outcomes in a manner that 
is insensitive to causal order. This default pattern operates in exactly the way anticipated by an 
associative account. 
A caveat of sorts is required here, relating to differences in the ease of mapping between 
temporal orders and causal orders. Consider López et al.’s (2005) study, in which participants were 
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required to use information regarding which lights were illuminated on the front of the box (cues) to 
predict which lights would be illuminated on the rear of the box (outcomes). In the predictive 
learning condition, participants were told that illumination of lights on the front (causes) caused 
illumination of lights on the rear (effects). Hence for these participants the temporal order of events 
(in which cues precede outcomes) was aligned with their causal order (in which causes precede 
effects), making it easy to map from temporal order to causal order by mapping cues to causes, and 
outcomes to effects. In contrast, in the diagnostic learning condition participants were told that 
illumination of lights on the front (effects) was caused by illumination of lights on the rear (causes). 
Hence in this condition the temporal order of events opposed their causal order. So diagnostic 
causal learning under these circumstances would require separating the temporal order of learning 
events from their causal order: it requires mapping cues to effects, and outcomes to causes. This 
separation of learning events and mental representations may be cognitively demanding. Perhaps 
participants might simply be unwilling to engage in this effortful process, and fall back on the 
simpler, predictive mapping (cues = causes, outcomes = effects) even though it is at odds with the 
actual causal structure. On this account, symmetry between diagnostic and predictive learning 
conditions—as observed in López et al.’s Experiment 1—does not necessarily reflect non-causal 
reasoning in the diagnostic condition. People may instead by reasoning causally, but incorrectly, in 
this condition. 
At this point the problem of unfalsifiability looms once more. If we find that a participant’s 
learning is at odds with causal structure, we could presumably always save a single-process, causal-
only account by arguing that the participant is reasoning causally, but is doing so based on an 
incorrect causal structure (even if, as in López et al.’s study, the participant is fully able to report 
the correct causal structure when asked). We shall consider a case below which stretches the 
plausibility of this ‘incorrect causal reasoning’ account even further, but more generally we leave it 
up to the reader to decide from themselves whether this type of essentially unfalsifiable argument is 
satisfactory. 
 21 
Is there anything special about causality? Part 2: Revisiting temporal contiguity 
We noted earlier that a critical factor in the learning of cueoutcome associations (whether they 
are causal or non-causal) is the degree of temporal contiguity between cue and outcome. Typically, 
a shorter delay between cue and outcome produces stronger learning, and (in the case of a causal 
relationship) stronger judgments of causality (see Buehner, this volume). The word ‘typically’ is 
important here, because in fact there are cases in which this law of temporal contiguity is broken. 
As in the case of causal order, these exceptions arise as a result of people taking account of the 
causal context of the judgment they are being asked to make. And once again, this influence of the 
specific nature of the events involved in learning on the pattern of what is learned, runs counter to 
the general-purpose approach offered by associative accounts. 
Consider, for example, a study by Buehner and May (2004; see also Buehner & May, 2002, 
2003), in which participants were asked to judge whether pressing a light switch made a bulb 
illuminate. For all participants, there was a 75% chance of the bulb illuminating if the switch had 
been pressed. In the zero delay condition, this illumination would occur immediately; in the long 
delay condition the bulb would illuminate 4 s after the button was pressed. The bulb never 
illuminated if the switch was not pressed. 
One group of participants was told that the bulb was an ordinary light bulb that should light 
up right away. These participants showed a standard temporal contiguity effect: after a training 
period during which they could press (or not press) the switch and observe the consequences, 
judgments of the strength of the causal relationship between switch and light were lower in the long 
delay condition than in the zero delay condition. In contrast, a second group of participants was told 
that the bulb was an energy-saving model that took 4 s to light up. These participants did not show a 
detrimental influence of delay on causal beliefs – ratings of causality were equally strong in the zero 
delay and long delay conditions. These results clearly demonstrate that a change in the causal model 
that underlies the task can change the influence of temporal contiguity on the beliefs that are 
developed. If the task was framed with a causal structure in which delay was expected, then causal 
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judgments no longer suffered as a result of experience of a delay. The implication is that 
participants’ understanding of the nature of events that they are experiencing influences the beliefs 
that they develop as a result of that experience. This finding is very difficult to reconcile with a 
purely associative account in which learning is about the relationship between cues and outcomes 
and is essentially blind to beliefs about the causal nature of the events that constitute those cues and 
outcomes. 
It is worth reflecting on the finding that participants who expected a delay in Buehner and 
May’s (2004) experiment were not sensitive to temporal contiguity (see also Buehner & May, 2002, 
2003): that is, their judgments were equally strong in the zero delay and long delay conditions. 
Surely, if participants were making proper use of the causal model inherent in the task description, 
judgments should actually have been lower in the zero delay condition. If they expected the bulb to 
illuminate 4 s after pressing the switch, then an immediate illumination should have been perceived 
as an ‘uncaused effect’, and weakened the perception of causality. The fact that this did not happen 
might be taken to suggest that close temporal contiguity is sufficient to support development of a 
causal belief even in the face of contrary expectation, and this suggestion is clearly easier to 
reconcile with an associative approach. That said, if the causal structure of the task is made more 
available, in order to strengthen participants’ expectation of a delay, then an advantage for training 
under long delay conditions relative to short delay is observed (Buehner & McGregor, 2006). This 
is somewhat similar to the manipulations used to strengthen participants’ attention to causal order 
described in the previous section. As in that case, the unsurprising conclusion is that, given 
sufficient motivation to consider the causal structure of a task when making judgments, participants 
are able to do so. 
A study by Schlottmann (1999) is particularly interesting in this regard. Children aged 
between 5 and 10 were presented with a ‘mystery box’. A ball dropped into one of two holes in one 
end of the box would cause a bell to ring at the other end, either immediately or after a short delay 
(3 seconds), depending on the hidden mechanism inserted into the box. Initially, children received 
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extensive experience with the two mechanisms outside the box, and were guided by the 
experimenter through a series of exercises designed to help them understand how one mechanism (a 
seesaw) would cause the bell to ring quickly when a ball was dropped, and the other (a runway) 
caused it to ring after a pause. This culminated in a prediction test in which, on each trial, one of the 
mechanisms was inserted into the box out of sight of the children. A ball was then dropped in, and 
children observed whether the bell rang immediately or after a delay; they were then asked to 
predict which of the mechanisms (seesaw or runway) was inside the box. Performance on this 
prediction test was near-perfect, regardless of the children’s age, demonstrating that children 
understood the difference in timing produced by the two mechanisms, and could make inferences 
on the basis of this understanding. 
In the final, critical test, children saw the experimenter place one of the two mechanisms in 
the box, but could not see which of the two holes the mechanism was placed under. A picture of the 
mechanism was placed in view on the outside of the box as a reminder. Next, the experimenter 
dropped one ball into one of the holes, paused, and then dropped a second ball into the second hole; 
the bell rang immediately after the second ball was dropped. Children were asked which of the two 
balls had made the bell ring. The correct answer to this question depends on the mechanism hidden 
inside the box. If the fast mechanism was present, then the correct answer would be that the second 
(contiguous) ball had made the bell ring. If the slow mechanism was present, then the correct 
answer would be the first (delayed) ball. Ten-year-olds were clearly able to make this distinction. 
However, younger children (5-7 year-olds) could not. In particular, when the slow mechanism was 
in the box, a majority of these younger children still claimed that the second (contiguous) ball had 
caused the bell to ring, even though these same children had demonstrated understanding that the 
slow mechanism produced a delay in the earlier prediction test.  
These results suggest that while older children are able to incorporate their causal 
understanding into their judgments, younger children instead continued to be led by contiguity even 
when this was at odds with the causal structure of the task. One interpretation of this difference is 
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that young children’s judgments are more likely to reflect the product of relatively automatic, 
associative processes that are insensitive to causal knowledge, whereas older children have 
developed the cognitive flexibility and executive function necessary to override these associative 
influences by the appropriate deployment of causal knowledge (given sufficient motivation to do so, 
and a sufficiently clear causal mechanism). This suggestion is certainly not without precedent in the 
developmental literature (e.g., see Kendler & Kendler, 1959, 1962, 1970; Kuhn & Pease, 2006). 
At the end of the previous section, we considered the possibility that cases of insensitivity to 
true causal structure, rather than supporting a dual-process account in which learning is sometimes 
the product of non-causal, associative processes, may instead reflect causal reasoning based on an 
incorrect causal structure. While such an argument could in theory be extended to explaining the 
insensitivity to the true causal mechanism demonstrated by Schlottmann’s (1999) younger children, 
this stretches the bounds of plausibility. These children were able to understand the true causal 
structure, as demonstrated by their performance in the prediction test. And application of a causal 
structure involving a three-second delay between cause and effect does not seem like it should be 
significantly more cognitively demanding than a structure with no delay. Hence we would argue 
that insensitivity to causal structure under these circumstances provides good evidence that learning 
need not always be mediated by causal reasoning. 
Selective conditioning in nonhuman animals 
The discussion in the previous sections is based around the premise that associative models involve 
learning about relationships between cues and outcomes, but are blind to the nature of the events 
that constitute those cues and outcomes. In fact the argument needs to be more nuanced than this. 
This is because there are well-established demonstrations in the literature on animal conditioning 
showing that learning can be influenced by the nature of the stimuli involved. 
Perhaps the clearest demonstration of this comes from classic studies of selective conditioning 
(also known as preparedness) in rats (e.g., Domjan & Wilson, 1972; Garcia & Koelling, 1966). For 
example, Domjan and Wilson trained two groups of rats. For one group, an infusion of saccharin-
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flavoured water into the mouth was used as the CS; for the other group, the sounding of a buzzer 
was the CS. For both groups, the US that was delivered at the termination of the CS was injection 
with lithium chloride in order to induce nausea. After three conditioning trials, rats were given two 
preference tests. Each test featured two drinking tubes. In the saccharin preference test, one tube 
was filled with saccharin and the other with water. In the buzzer preference test, both tubes were 
filled with water, but a buzzer was activated whenever the rat licked at one of the two tubes. Results 
indicated that rats had learned to avoid the saccharin flavour, but not the buzzer: on saccharin 
preference tests rats drank more from the water tube than the saccharin tube, but on buzzer 
preference tests rats drank from the buzzer tube and non-buzzer tube equally. The implication is that 
rats had learned to associate the flavour, but not the sound, with illness. Crucially, this pattern was 
not simply a result of the flavour being a more intense or noticeable CS. Two further groups of rats 
were conditioned using the same CSs, but the US was now an electric shock. In the final preference 
test these rats showed avoidance of the buzzer tube, but not of the saccharin tube—the exact 
opposite of rats trained with the nausea US—suggesting that they had learned to associate the 
sound, but not the flavour, with shock. 
This double dissociation clearly shows that the nature of the stimuli is an important 
determinant of conditioning in animals. Rats learned to associate an interoceptive CS (flavour) with 
an interoceptive US (nausea), and an exteroceptive stimulus (sound) with an exteroceptive US 
(shock), but did not learn to associate an interoceptive CS with an exteroceptive US or vice versa. 
So what, if any, is the fundamental difference between this example and the demonstrations of 
sensitivity to causal structure in humans described in previous sections? One option would be to 
argue that there is no difference: that examples of selective conditioning demonstrate that even the 
simplest examples of conditioning are a consequence of animals reasoning based on an internal 
causal model of the world (in which internal cues tend to produce internal outcomes, and external 
cues tend to produce external outcomes). If this is the correct interpretation, then the case for 
associative accounts of learning seems bleak. 
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However this interpretation is not one to which we subscribe. For one thing, the suggestion 
that even simple examples of Pavlovian conditioning reflect reasoning about causal structure has 
difficulty explaining the persistence of conditioned responding in the face of an omission 
contingency (see earlier). Instead it seems more likely that selective conditioning reflects innate 
predispositions that have been shaped by evolutionary processes (Rozin & Kalat, 1971). For 
example, in the evolutionary environment of a rat, tastes are likely to provide more reliable 
information than sounds regarding whether a food is poisonous. As such, animals who are 
predisposed to learn about such relationships will be more likely to survive and pass on this 
characteristic. 
Strong evidence in favour of this evolutionary account of selective conditioning comes from 
studies suggesting that the effect is present from birth, and certainly before rats have had useful 
prior experience with the sorts of stimuli that are involved. Gemberling and Domjan (1982) 
conditioned rats when they were only 24 hours old with either lithium-induced nausea or shock. 
These newborn rats showed clear evidence of selective conditioning. When the US was nausea, the 
saccharin flavour constituted an effective CS but an exteroceptive texture cue (either a rough cloth 
or the smooth interior of a cardboard box) did not. In contrast, when the US was shock, rats showed 
stronger evidence of conditioning to the texture than to the flavour. 
In summary, while selective conditioning in rats demonstrates a sensitivity to the nature of the 
events that are involved in conditioning, it seems unlikely that this is a consequence of the animals 
engaging in ‘online’ inferences based on an internalized causal model of the world. Instead this 
sensitivity seems to reflect innate predispositions towards associating certain classes of stimuli, but 
not others. Hence a general-purpose associative account is sufficient to explain these findings if it is 
augmented with the idea that this associative process operates through a filter of innate mechanisms 
that will tend to favour formation of some associations over others. This is quite different from the 
cases of sensitivity to causal structure in humans described earlier. Many of those experiments used 
scenarios in which it is implausible to suggest that we have developed innate evolutionary 
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tendencies (e.g., balls rolling along runways and ringing bells; switches turning on light-bulbs; 
grenade-launchers firing at tanks etc). Instead it seems clear that sensitivity to causal structure in 
such studies results from a process of causal reasoning based on an internalized model of the world, 
with this reasoning taking place during the task itself. And it seems equally clear that such a process 
lies beyond any purely associative approach to learning. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have argued that in attempting to assess the validity of an associative 
account of causal learning, we need to move away from considering specific implementations of 
associative models and instead focus on the general principle embodied by the associative approach. 
This principle is that learning is concerned with the relationship between cues and outcomes; that 
the rules governing learning are general-purpose, and hence do not differentiate between situations 
involving cause–effect relationships and those involving signalling relationships that are non-
causal. An association merely encodes the information that two events ‘go together’, not that one 
causes the other. Ultimately, the associationist framework argues that causal learning can be based 
on a process that is fundamentally non-causal. In other words, people may encode an association 
between event E1 and event E2 that has no notion of causality about it. However, they may then 
interpret this association as supporting the existence of a causal relationship between events. 
Suppose that I have formed a strong association between E1 and E2, but a weak association 
between E3 and E2. I am then asked which of E1 or E3 is more likely to be a cause of E2. Under 
these circumstances it would seem a sensible heuristic to choose the event that has the stronger 
association with E2 (E1 in this case), even though the associations do not actually encode causal 
information. 
This idea that associations have heuristic value with regard to causality is an important one. 
Events that are causally related will typically tend to go together in the world, and hence will tend 
to become associated. As such the existence of an association can reasonably be taken as an 
indication of a causal relationship. Of course, this inductive leap from observing correlation to 
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inferring causation is actually logically invalid: as psychology undergraduates are repeatedly told, 
‘Correlation does not imply causation’. But the fact that we need to repeat this mantra so often to 
our students is also an indication of how seductive it is to equate correlation and causation. Indeed, 
humans seem to be very susceptible to such correlational learning: superstitions (e.g., walking under 
a ladder will cause bad luck; carrying a rabbit’s foot will bring good luck) occur in all societies 
around the world, and can be seen as a failure to distinguish between causes and mere associates. 
The implication is that, often, people are happy to take associations between events as a proxy 
for causal relations. Why should this be the case? The most likely reason, as is generally the case 
for heuristics, is one of effort. It is much easier to encode the covariation between two events than 
to impute a causal relationship between them, because the latter requires making interventions and 
observing their consequences (cf. Rottman, this volume; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2005), but this 
may not always be easy or even possible. For example, it is simple to observe that the phase of the 
moon covaries with the size of ocean tides, but proving a causal relationship by intervening to 
change the moon’s phase and observing the effect on the tide is impossible. The effort argument 
becomes even more apparent as additional potential causes are introduced. It is simple to apply the 
Rescorla–Wagner model to any number of cues, presented individually or in combination, in order 
to track their covariation with any number of outcomes, again presented individually or in 
combination. However, deriving an accurate causal model of the relationships between multiple 
stimuli and outcomes on the basis of experience is a considerably more challenging computational 
problem (Chickering, Heckerman & Meek, 2004; Ellis & Wong, 2008). 
Of course, this is not to suggest for a moment that people are unable to reason in a more 
careful fashion about causal relationships. We have provided examples in this chapter in which 
people have been shown to be sensitive to causal structures when making judgments in a way that 
does not follow from an associative approach. But really, these examples are unnecessary – it is 
immediately obvious that people can describe and understand causal mechanisms, and so it would 
be lunacy to suggest that an associative account could ever provide a full account of human causal 
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behaviour. However, as Shanks (2007) noted, “To focus (as many researchers do) on the fact that 
there is a pattern of judgements… that is inconsistent with associative theory is to miss the point: 
To repeat, it is not a matter of debate that people can reason normatively or logically under certain 
circumstances” (p300). Of more interest (at least for the purposes of the current chapter) is the 
finding that judgments often do not reflect sensitivity to causal structure, even when participants 
can evidently understand the causal structure involved in the task. Such a pattern has typically been 
reported in situations in which participants are not given strong prompting to make use of causal 
structure information when making their judgments. These findings point to a role for associative 
processes in explaining some aspects of causal behaviour, and suggest more generally that, in some 






1  A possible exception is superstitious beliefs. For example, I might (by coincidence) experience 
several occasions on which I wear a particular pair of socks and my favourite football team wins 
their match, and as a result I might develop the instrumental belief that wearing those socks causes 
the team to win. But of course there is no real causal relationship between these events. 
Nevertheless, this form of superstitious instrumental learning is based on the belief in a causal 
relationship. 
2  There is a subtlety here that is worth noting. As mentioned, one view that has been proposed is 
that associative learning is mediated by the formation of propositions that describe the relationship 
between events (Mitchell et al., 2009). Unlike the other approaches to associative learning outlined 
here, which are restricted to representing covariation, the propositional account has the potential to 
represent either covariation information (i.e., the proposition that ‘event A is associated with event 
B’), or causal information (the proposition that ‘event A causes event B’). So learning based on 
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Table 1. Design of the within-subjects blocking experiment by McNally and Cole (2006). 
 
Stage 1 Stage 2 Test Result 
A  shock AB  shock B Greater fear of B 
than D  CD  shock D 
 
Note:  A and C are visual stimuli (constant light and flashing light, counterbalanced across 
subjects); B and D are auditory stimuli (white noise and clicker, counterbalanced across 
participants). 
 
